SPAIN: It was ‘incomprehensible’ that a high speed line equipped with ERTMS would not have it installed at a location where a speed restriction meant it was so obviously required, the judge said when a criminal court reached its verdict on the July 24 2013 derailment of a Class 730 Alvia train.
The RENFE inter-city service from Madrid to Ferrol entered a tight curve on the approach to Santiago de Compostela at 191 km/h, more than twice the permitted 80 km/h. It came off the rails at 176 km/h, resulting in 79 deaths and 143 injuries.
On July 26 — 11 years and two days after the derailment — the judge said that the RENFE train driver and the former Head of Operational Safety at infrastructure manager ADIF had breached the duty of care imposed on them by their positions. Their actions represented an unlawful increase in a risk that they were obliged to prevent and capable of avoiding, he added.
Both have been sentenced to 30 months in prison, and prevented from resuming their professional activities for a further 54 months.
RENFE and ADIF insurers QBE and Allianz Global must now pay out more than €25m to those affected by the derailment. The court found that the accident did not cause the death of one of the passengers 73 days later, which was a consequence of an illness, although it did weaken his health.
The court found that there were several causes.
The driver’s actions were deemed seriously negligent. He was distracted by a 100 sec mobile phone call from the guard requesting a change of track at Puentedume station, to the extent that he lost his bearings. Despite his route knowledge, he did not see signals warning him of the approach to the curve.
Reducing the train’s speed after a long stretch of 200 km/h track was left entirely in the hands of the driver, with no lineside automatic train protection equipment even though this was legally required where the line speed was abruptly lowered.
The signalling contractors had identified the curve as a possible derailment risk, and had recommended using ERTMS as an overlay on the ASFA ATP, but ADIF had not undertaken a risk assessment. In autumn 2011 the Head of Operational Safety had ignored the gap in the line’s ATP when submitting documentation to the government, stating that the line was ready to be put into use.
Following the accident, ADIF identified more than 300 other locations on the network where there were similar significant changes in permitted line speed.
